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PROOF OF DAMAGES IN MARITIME PERSONAL
INJURY CASES: ADJUSTING LEGAL THEORIES TO
THE COURTROOM
Arthur Abarbanel*
Several practical considerations should be made by a plaintiffs
attorney when deciding how to submit or present his proof of
damages in a maritime personal injury or death case during the
course of a trial. In this connection, to understand what has to be
proven in the way of damages it is necessary to set forth a brief
history of the law applicable to damages.
In the early days the courts refused to recognize a general
maritime law wrongful death remedy.1 In an effort to provide relief
from the harsh rule of The Harrisburg,2 The Jones Act' and The
Death on the High Seas Act4 (DOHSA) were passed in 1920. The
Jones Act provided a remedy to an injured seaman, and, in cases of
death, to his beneficiaries based on negligence against his employer.
On the other hand, DOHSA provided a cause of action based on
negligence or unseaworthiness arising from deaths on the high seas.
The high seas were defined as being beyond a marine league from
the shore of any state or the District of Columbia or the territories
or dependencies of the United States. A marine league was
equivalent to three nautical, marine, or geographical miles, which
corresponds to 3.45 statute or English miles. Numerous cases were
decided under these two statutes over the years. The next signifi-
cant development was Moragne v. States Marine Lines.' This case
overruled The Harrisburg and held that the general maritime law
did provide a remedy for wrongful death.' The Court left open such
issues as to what constitutes damages under the new cause of action
and what beneficiaries are entitled to recover these damages. The
next important and significant case was Sea-Land Services, Inc. v.
Gaudet,7 in which the Supreme Court held that nonpecuniary
damages or losses such as the loss of society and funeral benefits
*B.S., New York University; L.L.B., Columbia University; L.L.M., New York
University. Member, New York Bar.
1. The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886).
2. 119 U.S. 199 (1886).
3. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976).
4. 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-68 (1976).
5. 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
6. Id at 409.
7. 414 U.S. 573 (1974).
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were recoverable in a Moragne type of action.8 The Sea-Land Ser-
vices, Inc. decision set forth the elements of damages, and in effect
it went beyond DOHSA in granting nonpecuniary damages."
Then came various decisions interpreting the Moragne and
Gaudet decisions. In Landry v. Two R. Drilling Company,'° the fifth
circuit held that where a seaman sustained injuries in state ter-
ritorial waters resulting in his death, based upon a finding of
negligence and unseaworthiness, his beneficiaries could recover
nonpecuniary damages as set forth in the Gaudet decision. 1 In Law
v. Sea Drilling Corp.'" the fifth circuit, in effect, discarded DOHSA
as a remedy by holding that Gaudet remedies applied to naviagable
waters regardless of where the accident occurred, including the high
seas." Thus Gaudet damages would be applied to accidents occur-
ring on high seas as well as in state territorial waters.
Various courts throughout the county did not agree with Law v.
Sea Drilling Corp. The nonpecuniary damages issue came up before
the Supreme Court in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham," an action
for damages under DOHSA and the general maritime law. On ap-
peal, the appellate court ruled that some of the decedents were
Jones Act seamen. 5 The Supreme Court held that where death oc-
curred on the high seas, the general maritime law did not provide
for nonpecuniary damages such as loss of society and that the
Gaudet damages applied only in territorial waters, while DOHSA ap-
plied on the high seas. The Court construed damages under
DOHSA as providing only pecuniary damages.
The next decisions on the Moragne and Gaudet cases after Hig-
ginbotham were in the fifth circuit. In Ivy v. Security Barge Lines,
Inc.'" the court held that in an accident caused by negligence which
occurred in state territorial waters resulting in the death of a Jones
Act seaman, the beneficiaries could not secure Gaudet damages such
as loss of society. 8 In that case, although there was a cause of action
based on negligence and the general maritime law, the jury only
8. Id at 584.
9. Id. at 583-91.
10. 511 F.2d 138 (5th Cir. 1975).
11. Id at 142-43.
12. 523 F. 793 (5th Cir. 1975).
13. Id at 798.
14. 436 U.S. 618 (1978).
15. 545 F.2d 422 (5th Cir. 1977).
16. 436 U.S. at 622-23.
17. 606 F.2d 524 (5th Cir. 1979).
18. Id at 529.
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found that the defendant was negligent.19 The next natural question
to be resolved was whether the beneficiaries of a Jones Act seaman
who died in state territorial waters as a result of an accident based
on the general maritime law, as opposed to negligence under the
Jones Act, could claim nonpecuniary damages under the Gaudet doc-
trine. The decisions in Hlodan v. Ohio Barge Lines, Inc.2° and Smith
v. Ithaca Corp." held that they could. The next issue resolved by the
Supreme Court was whether the general maritime law provided for
a loss of consortium as damages. In American Export Lines, Inc. v.
Alvez,2" the Supreme Court held that the maritime law did provide
for wife's claim of loss of consortium." In that particular case the
plaintiff who sustained non-fatal injuries in state territorial waters
was a longshoreman. His wife claimed loss of consortium under the
Gaudet doctrine. The Court stated that the wife was entitled to
damages for loss of consortium in injuries occurring in state ter-
ritorial waters.24
The most recent Supreme Court decision involved a question of
whether a jury should be instructed in a Federal Employer's Liability
Act (FELA) case that the defendant could diminish the plaintiff's
claim by having the jury consider the decedent's net earnings as
damages after deduction of income taxes he would have paid and the
fact that the award was not taxable; the question was answered in
the affirmative in Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Liepelt. 5
In view of the limitations imposed by the Higginbotham decision
on accidents occurring on the high seas, it is necessary that all
elements of damages are presented in order to get the maximum
recovery. This writer will now attempt to set forth the various
elements of damages that a trial attorney in a maritime injury and
death case should present.
ELEMENTS OF DAMAGES
In attempting to evaluate the elements of damages in maritime
personal injury and death cases, an attorney should consider the
following factors which will demonstrate pecuniary losses on behalf
of clients: (1) loss of support and earnings; (2) loss of services; (3) loss
of nurture and guidance; (4) loss of fringe benefits; (5) loss of funeral
19. Id at 525.
20. 611 F.2d 71 (5th Cir. 1980).
21. 612 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1980).
22. 100 S. Ct. 1673 (1980).
23. Id. at 1674.
24. Id.
25. 100 S. Ct. 755 (1980).
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expenses; (6) loss of prospective inheritance; (7) loss of society and
consortium; (8) award of prejudgment interest; (9) loss of food and
lodging; (10) pain and suffering; (11) punitive damages; (12) present
value against inflation; and (13) use of an economist.
The aforesaid are major factors which trial attorneys should
take into consideration when presenting damages. These factors will
be discussed in maritime personal injury and death cases. Unfor-
tunately, too many times these elements are denied by the courts
not because they are invalid, but because the attorney has failed to
present to the court adequate proof and has failed to make an exten-
sive investigation. Therefore, it is important to perform a proper in-
vestigation.
Loss of Support and Earning Capacity
Loss of support and earning capacity are intertwined and will be
discussed together. Petition of Risdal & Anderson, Inc."6 set forth
certain guidelines concerning loss of support and earning capacity
which are: (1) actual earning; (2) future earning; (3) health; (4)
diligence and work habits; (5) prospect of advancement; (6) economic
conditions of industry; (7) life expectancy; and (8) work expectancy.
Using these guidelines in preparation for trial, a detailed,
thorough, and complete investigation and analysis should be made
with respect to their application to the client. The facts, statistics,
and data should be assembled immediately. The use of an economist
should be made to evaluate the data and to present it to the court
and jury. Courts accept the use of an economist as an expert
witness in trials. Economists can substantiate many of the aforemen-
tioned items which some courts have described as tenuous or
speculative. One of the most crucial elements of damages for the in-
jured or deceased is the earnings record. There is no question about
this being a proper element of damages. It is most important to
secure employment records, income tax returns, W-2 forms, social
security records, or employment personnel records.
The next important aspect to ascertain is the future earning
capacity of the client or the decedent. This can be done by acquiring
and analyzing the rates of wage increases that the unions represent-
ing the worker have acquired over a past number of years. There
are other sources of wage increases in the various industries. The
economist can then project a percentage increase which can be used
as the basis for calculating future earning capacity and losses. In ad-
26. 291 F. Supp. 353 (D. Mass. 1968).
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dition to this, one can acquire by testimony from the employer the
ability, competence, esteem, and probability of advancement of the
client. Another factor that should be taken into consideration is
health and work habits. This can be secured from employment and
medical records. The economic condition of the industry should be
characterized as to whether it is a growing one and if there is room
for advancement. This can readily be done by the economist by
drawing from governmental and non-governmental sources. This
type of information is acceptable as evidence.'
The work and life expectancy of the individual should be
presented. The emphasis should be placed on the average expec-
tancy of the individual concerned. This can be acquired not only
statistically from public and private sources, but also from the per-
sonal employment and medical records for the individual concerned.
Additional assistance can now be secured from the federal Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, which prevents employers, ex-
cept under certain conditions, from forcing a worker to retire before
seventy years of age. One should attempt to show that the worker
was conscientious and diligent and that he would have continued to
work as long as he was able and capable. Testimony should be in-
troduced as to the employee's diligence and work habits. Lost earn-
ings to the present are taken at full value and not discounted.
Future earnings will be discussed later.
With respect to the wife and children, it is not necessary for
them to prove dependency in a case of death." However, parents
and other next of kin do have to demonstrate their dependence upon
the decedent.
If one will gather carefully the evidence using the procedures
suggested herein, the full loss of support and wages will be readily
demonstrated to the court and jury.
Loss of Services
Loss of services of a decedent in the maritime case has long
been held an item of pecuniary damages. There is no dispute with
respect to this.
When presenting evidence concerning this loss, one should con-
duct a thorough inquiry as to what kind of work the individual was
27. See Perry v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 489 F.2d 1349 (2d Cir. 1974).
28. See Civil v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 217 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1954); Cleveland
Tankers, Inc. v. Tierney, 169 F.2d 622 (6th Cir. 1948).
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capable of doing, such as painting, plumbing, carpentry, roofing,
electrical wiring, lawnmowing, snow shoveling, garbage disposal,
automotive repairs, or any other type of work. Once the evidence is
produced as to what services were performed, then an economist
can be utilized to evaluate monetarily these services. This is is most
important, particularly with the price of these services constantly
increasing. It naturally follows that pecuniary damages will also in-
crease. There are various statistics which establish the value of
these types of services. Most maritime workers are skillful and per-
form handyman types of services. These assorted services should
not be overlooked.
Loss of Nurture and Guidance
In proving pecuniary loss, loss of nurture and guidance is
another loss that should not be omitted. The courts have held that
these are pecuniary losses. The leading case in this area is Michigan
Central Railroad Company v. Vreeland."
There are many factors that should be taken into consideration
when securing information to support a claim for loss of nurture and
guidance. For example, how much shore leave did the decedent
spend with the child and the family? Such aspects as care, moral and
religious training, advice, attention, guidance, education, help with
school, sports, recreation, vacations, outings and other items of this
type should be covered. They should not be looked into lightly.
These items can be proven by testimony from neighbors, friends,
relatives, as well as from the children themselves.
Although the age of majority terminates nurture and guidance,
other facts and circumstances may extend this support beyond the
age of majority. For example, a child who has the ability and aspira-
tions to continue education to a higher level would be entitled to
further nurture and guidance. The child may be disabled or may be
suffering from some malignancy, which would require extended
medical care and treatment for an indefinite period. This would also
enlarge the period."
Although marital nurture has not been allowed, one should not
overlook this claim in view of the recent decisions as a result of the
Gaudet, Hlodan, Ithaca Corp., and Alvez cases. These decisions allow
for loss of society under the general maritime law in state territorial
waters, and therefore, marital nurture could be recoverable in these
situations.
29. 227 U.S. 59 (1913).
30. See Consolidated Mach., Inc. v. Protein Prod. Corp., 428 F. Supp. 209 (M.D.
Fla. 1976); Hamilton v. Canal Barge Co., Inc., 395 F. Supp. 978 (E.D. La. 1975).
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Fringe Benefits
An element of damage which frequently is overlooked is the
area of fringe benefits. This element can apply in cases of fatally
and non-fatally injured maritime workers. Contributions made by
employers to pension, vacation, and welfare plans and social security
are really a form of wages and a pecuniary loss. When a maritime
worker is injured, either he or his next of kin is deprived of these
benefits. These figures are readily available in welfare, pension, and
vacation trust agreements and can be proven by the use of these
documents with the aid of union officials and administrators of
various plans as witnesses.
Funeral Expenses
Until recently there has been a conflict over whether funeral ex-
penses are a proper pecuniary damage. It was held in Barbe v.
Drummond" that under DOHSA, funeral expenses are not a
pecuniary damage. Under the general maritime law, Dennis v. Cen-
tral Gulf Steamship Corp.32 held that such expense was a pecuniary
damage. This conflict was put to rest in the Mobil Oil v. Higgin-
botham"3 case, in which it was held that under the Jones Act,
DOHSA, or the general maritime law, funeral expenses are
recoverable as an item of damage. In the Gaudet case," the Supreme
Court held that funeral expenses were recoverable under the
general maritime law. The court in Higginbotham evidently based
its reasoning on the theory that but for the wrongful death, the
decedent would have accumulated an estate large enough to pay for
his own funeral and therefore held funeral expenses to be a
beneficiary's damage. It is difficult to understand how the court in
Higginbotham made this distinction as an item of damage, but not
loss of services under DOSHA.
Loss of Inheritance
Although allowed, loss of inheritance, as a rule, is not claimed.
In order to secure this as an item of damage, one would have to
show and establish a pattern of systematic estate building. It should
be ascertained whether the decedent maintained savings, invest-
ment in real estate, stocks, bonds, and other items of this type. If
shown, it is reasonable to conclude that the decedent would have
gathered an estate for his personal use at the time of his retire-
31. 507 F.2d 794 (1st Cir. 1974).
32. 453 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972).
33. 436 U.S. 618 (1978).
34. Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573 (1974).
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ment. Once it is demonstrated that an inheritable estate has been
established, then all that must be proven is that his beneficiaries,
had the decedent lived, would be the recipients of the estate in the
logical sequence of events.3 1
Loss of Society and Consortium
Loss of society and consortium until recently has been held not
to be an item of damage in the maritime case. Sea-Land Services,
Inc. v. Gaudet3' radically changed this. In Gaudet, the plaintiff was
the widow of a longshoreman who sustained, in state territorial
waters, personal injuries for which he had already sued and
recovered damages. Thereafter, he died from the injuries. The
widow then sued for wrongful death damages such as loss of society
and funeral expenses. The Court held that the widow was entitled to
loss of society damages and funeral expenses under the general
maritime law.37 The Court defined the term "society" as a broad
range of mutual benefits each family member receives from the con-
tinued existence of the family unit, including love, affection, care, at-
tention, companionship, comfort, and protection. 8 In Mobil v. Higgin-
botham,9 the Supreme Court held that this loss of society was not
compensable for maritime injuries on the high seas under either
DOHSA or the general maritime law. The Higginbotham court made
no specific mention of the Jones Act, but by implication its decision
may apply to it. The Court limited this loss of society to injuries and
deaths occurring in state territorial waters under the general
maritime law. Gaudet indicated that loss of consortium was part of
loss of society."
Although the Moragne decision not only did away with an in-
equitable maritime rule, it also was intended to establish a uniform
general maritime law to be applied universally.4 In Mobil Oil Corp.
v. Higginbotham, the Court in limiting loss of society has achieved
an opposite result. Although there is loss of society for a maritime
injury in state territorial waters, there is no such cause of action on
the high seas. Therefore, the beneficiaries of a seaman injured in
territorial waters can recover these damages, while if the death or
injury occurs on the high seas, there is no recovery.
35. See Soloman v. Warren, 540 F.2d 777 (5th Cir. 1976); Blumenthal v. United
States, 306 F.2d 16 (3d Cir. 1962).
36. 414 U.S. 573 (1974).
37. Id at 584.
38. Id. at 585.
39. 436 U.S. 618 (1978).
40. 414 U.S. at 622.
41. 398 U.S. at 405-08.
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The Court in Higginbotham stated that, although the measure of
damages may be different in coastal waters than on the high seas, it
cannot override the definite meaning of DOHSA as a statute.42 In a
footnote the'Court stated that it remains to be seen whether the dif-
ference between awarding loss of society damages under Gaudet
and denying them under DOHSA has great practical significance. '" It
then implied that perhaps this disparity can be reconciled by allow-
ing an award that is primarily symbolic as opposed to a substantial
portion of the survivor's recovery." As indicated previously herein,
the courts have allowed loss of services in seaman's injury in state
territorial waters pursuant to the general maritime law. 5 They have
not allowed such recovery under the Jones Act in state territorial
waters." Thus, we have come full circle once more, and we have
again the lack of uniformity that the Moragne decision attempted to
alleviate.
With respect to loss of consortium, which is really an aspect of
loss of society on the part of the wife, American Export Lines, Inc.
v. Alvez" held that loss of consortium is allowed for the wife of an
injured maritime worker or of a deceased maritime worker who sus-
tained injuries in state territorial waters." In this particular in-
stance the wife of a non-fatally injured longshoreman sought
damages for loss of consortium, and the Court held that she was en-
titled to it. Therefore, it would naturally follow that in cases of fatally
or non-fatally injured maritime claimants, particularly cases in which
claims of seamen are brough pursuant to the general maritime law,
a claim of loss of consortium, as an element of damages where the
injured has sustained injuries in state territorial waters, would be
upheld."
Prejudgment Interest
Quite frequently, attorneys fail to request an award for prejudg-
ment interest. There is no question that the admiralty court within
its discretion can award prejudgment interest."0 In cases brought on
42. 436 U.S. at 624-25.
43. Id. at 624-25 n.20.
44. Id.
45. See Smith v. Ithaca Corp., 612 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1980); Hlodan v. Ohio Barge
Lines, Inc., 611 F.2d 71 (5th Cir. 1980).
46. See Ivy v. Security Barge Lines, Inc., 606 F.2d 524 (5th Cir. 1979).
47. 100 S. Ct. 1673 (1980).
48. Id. at 1674.
49. See Smith v. Ithaca Cbrp., 612 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1980); Hlodan v. Ohio Barge
Lines, Inc., 611 F.2d 71 (5th Cir. 1980).
50. American Union Transport Co. v. Aquadilla Terminal, Inc., 302 F.2d 394 (1st
Cir. 1962).
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the admiralty side, the power is undisputed; a dispute arises as to
whether the court has the discretion to award prejudment interest
involving the Jones Act or unseaworthiness on the law side. The
trend has been for the courts to allow this as damage."
It is argued that the awarding of prejudment interest should be
made only as a liquidated sum. On the admiralty side, the sum is liq-
uidated by the court, while on the civil side it is not liquidated un-
til the jury renders a verdict. This argument was rejected in Nye v.
A/S DIS Svendborg.5" The federal district court held that it should
make no difference whether the case is brought on the admiralty
side or the law side in awarding prejudgment interest. 3 The Nye
court held that it is only fair to award prejudgment interest
regardless of the side on which the case is brought.
There is some dispute on whether prejudgment interest should
be requested when charging the jury" or whether, after the jury
renders its verdict, the court should then be requested to award.5
Either practice seems acceptable and proper.
The award of prejudgment interest is discretionary with the
court, and one should not forget to make such request.
Loss of Food and Lodging
When a seaman is employed aboard a vessel, he is provided with
food and lodging. This has a monetary value which one should not
omit as damages. It has been held that this item is one which can be
recovered.56
Conscious Pain and Suffering
Conscious pain and suffering is either the suffering endured by
an injured maritime claimant while recovering from an injury, or
51. Robinson v. Pocahontas, Inc., 477 F.2d 1048 (1st Cir. 1973); Williamson v.
Western Pac. Dredging Corp., 441 F.2d 65 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 851 (1971);
Parisi v. Lady In Blue, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 681 (D. Mass. 1977); Nye v. A/S D/S Svend-
borg, 358 F. Supp. 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1973, ajf'd 501 F.2d 376 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 964 (1975); Gardner v. National Bulk Carriers, Inc., 333 F.2d 676 (4th Cir.
1964); Choest v. A & P Boat Rentals, 321 F. Supp. 1290 (E.D. La. 1971); Petition of
Mariana Mercante Nicaraguense, S.A., 248 F. Supp. 15 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), affd with
modifications, 364 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1005 (1967).
52. 358 F. Supp. 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), affd, 501 F.2d 376 (2d Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 964 (1975).
53. 358 F. Supp. at 150.
54. Parisi v. Lady In Blue, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 681 (D. Mass. 1977).
55. Choest v. A & P Boat Rentals, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 1290 (E.D. La. 1971).
56. Bartholomew v. Universe Tankships, Inc., 279 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1960); Curry v.
United States, 338 F. Supp. 1219 (D. Cal. 1971).
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the pain and suffering decedent had prior to his death. This is an im-
portant element of damage and should be presented in the proper
light. If possible, witnesses who observed the pain and suffering
should be presented so that a proper description can be
demonstrated. Medical witnesses can be used to describe the pain
based on their professional experience.
There is no doubt that conscious pain and suffering is
recoverable under the Jones Act and the general maritime law.
There is some question as to whether conscious pain and suffering is
recoverable under DOHSA. In Barbe v. Drummond,57 the first circuit
held that DOHSA excluded recovery for conscious pain and suffer-
ing.58 However, in the Barbe case it was interesting to note that
although the claim for conscious pain and suffering was denied
under DOHSA, it was granted under the state survival statute. 9
Punitive Damages
It has long been thought and argued that the maritime law does
not provide for punitive damages. A recent decision in a state ap-
pellate court in California, Baptiste v. Superior Court,"° held that the
maritime law did provide for punitive damages where the facts in-
dicated a basis for it.6 The case was remanded to the trial court for
trial on this issue. In describing whether a pleading will state a
cause of action on the maritime law for punitive damages, the court
stated that there must be something more than the mere commis-
sion of a tort."2 There must be circumstances of aggravation or
outrage, such as spite or a malicious, fraudulent, or evil motive on
the part of the defendant, or such a conscious and deliberate
disregard of the interest of others that the conduct may be called
willful or wanton." Therefore, it is most important when pleading
any cause of action for punitive damages that the attorney set forth
with precise detail the facts constituting the cause for punitive
damages. Too frequently, this is not done or shown during trial, and
that is the reason why the courts have rejected the award of
punitive damages. In the Baptiste case, there is a detailed analysis
and history of the maritime law with respect to punitive damages."
57. 507 F.2d 794 (1st Cir. 1974).
58. Id. at 797-99.
59. Id. at 799-800.
60. 164 Cal. Rptr. 789 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
61. Id at 798.
62. Id. at 792.
63. Id
64. Id at 793-98.
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It is interesting to note that in Baptiste there were causes of action
based on negligence under the Jones Act and unseaworthiness 5 The
court said that the federal maritime law does not preclude the im-
position of punitive damages as a matter of law under either of
these causes of action."6 In the Baptiste case the employer knew of
unsafe high noise levels in the engine room. Rather than take the
necessary steps to correct this condition in a safe and proper man-
ner, the employer took an economic shortcut to save money, since
the ships were due to be scrapped or sold.67 These facts, the court
held, formed the basis for a trial of the issue of whether punitive
damages should be awarded. 8
Present Value Against Inflation
With respect to loss of future earnings, the courts uniformly in-
struct the jury that it should derive the present value of these by
discounting the amount of money claimed to be lost. This means, in
simple terms, that the future lost earnings are discounted at a rate
so that if the money is presently invested at this rate, over the
period of time of lost earnings, it would yield the future lost earn-
ings. This is known as present value and is accepted by the courts.
It is most important that, in establishing present value and the dis-
count rate, an economist be used. He should present data to show
the proper discount rate. Too frequently, defense attorneys argue
that the current high rate of yield should be utilized. However, the
economist can compute the average yield over a period of time and
thus arrive at a proper discount rate.
Most courts have invariably held through the years that a jury
should not be instructed to take into consideration inflation since it
is too difficult to evalute. Plaintiffs attorneys are hoping for a
change in the jurisprudence as a result of the Court's decision in
Norfolk and Western Railway Company v. Liepelt.69 As previously
noted, the Supreme Court held in this case that it was error to ex-
clude evidence of the income tax payable on the decedent's past and
estimated future earnings, and that the jury should also be in-
structed that the award of damages would not be subjected to in-
come tax."0 Although it was requested by the decedent's widow that
the jury should be instructed that she would have to pay attorneys'
65. Id. at 798.
66. Id. at 794-97.
67. Id at 791.
68. Id at 798.
69. 100 S. Ct. 755 (1980).
70. Id at 759.
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fees on recovery, this instruction was denied.7 The Court, however,
made an interesting statement with respect to what can be
estimated and predicted:
But future employment itself, future health, future personal ex-
penditures, future interest rates, and future inflation are also
matters of estimate and prediction. Any one of these issues
might provide the basis for protracted expert testimony and
debate. But the practical wisdom of the trial bar and the trial
bench has developed effective methods of presenting the essen-
tial elements of an expert calculation in a form that is
understandable by juries that are increasingly familiar with the
complexities of modern life."'
It is obvious that the Court is saying that inflation no longer is
speculative and can be predicted. It is equally obvious that the
Court is saying that an economist can give testimony with respect
to inflation. Therefore, it would follow that a request to charge the
jury with respect to inflation is proper. Inflation would then set off
any discount rate on future earnings. A simple charge of this nature
in Petition M/V Elaine Jones73 was found acceptable. The jury was
charged that decreasing purchasing power of the dollar is a proper
element for consideration in determining the amount of the award.'
This charge is another way of saying inflation is a factor that should
be taken into consideration by the jury.
Economist
The courts are accepting the use of an economist." Further im-
portance has been given to the use of an economist and similar ex-
perts in Norfolk and Western Railway Company v. Liepelt,7' as in-
dicated in the quotation above.
The problem that many trial attorneys incur with the use of an
economist is that proper preparation is not made. If one prepares
the economist to have all the necessary and relevant data and
material upon which to base his recommendations and conclusions,
this information will be admitted into evidence. If the proper foun-
dation is not level, naturally it follows that the data, information,
and opinions will not be admitted.
71. Id. at 758.
72. Id.
73. 480 F.2d 11 (5th Cir. 1973).
74. Id. at 28-29.
75. See Perry v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 489 F.2d 1349 (2d Cir. 1974); In re
Sincere Navigation Corp., 329 F. Supp. 652 (E.D. La. 1971).
76. 100 S. Ct. 755 (1980).
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SOLUTION
The Higginbotham case" has severely limited damages when the
accident occured on the high seas. Loss of society is not permitted;
only pecuniary damages are permitted. Of course, the easiest solu-
tion to this problem would be to have Congress enact legislation to
provide specifically that loss of society, including consortium, is a
recoverable damage in all maritime cases. Therefore, efforts should
be made to secure the enactment of appropriate legislation. One of
the most difficult situations for a plaintiff's attorney is to explain to
the parents of a seaman who died in an accident that they are not
entitled to be compensated for love, affection, care, attention, com-
panionship, and protection. The loss of these is a damage for which
there should be compensation.
As long as the law is not amended, attorneys should attempt to
distinguish the Higginbotham decision. Although the Court in Hig-
ginbotham held that some of the deceased persons were Jones Act
seamen,"8 it decided the case pursuant to DOHSA and the general
maritime law."' As noted, it did not render any decision specifically
with respect to the Jones Act.0 DOHSA specifically uses the term
"pecuniary loss."" On the other hand, the Jones Act 2 and FELA 3 do
not use the term "pecuniary loss."
In determining damages under the Jones Act, it can be argued
logically that the Jones Act, though fashioned after FELA, does not
necessarily have to adopt the FELA decisions with respect to
pecuniary damages which exclude loss of society. Therefore, one
can argue and claim that the Jones Act does not preclude loss of
society as a damage.
This was recognized in Ivy v. Security Barge Lines, Inc.,4 when
the dissenting judge, Chief Judge John Brown, stated as follows:
To be sure, FELA case law has often provided a persuasive start-
ing point for analyzing Jones Act claims. But in general "The ad-
miralty has led not followed." The seaman is thought to be
thought to be subject to greater risks for inconveniences than
the railroad worker. Accordingly, the Jones Act has frequently
77. 436 U.S. 618 (1978).
78. Id
79. Id. at 624-26.
80. Id. at 621 n.11.
81. 46 U.S.C. § 762 (1976).
82. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976).
83. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1976).
84. 606 F.2d 524 (5th Cir. 1979).
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granted relief where the FELA has not. Thus the employer's
defense of assumption of risk of the shipowner's negligence was
eliminated in Jones Act cases, while the FELA continued to per-
mit this defense. And in Cox v. Roth, 1955, 348 U.S. 207, 75 Sup.
Ct., 242, 99 L. ed. 260, 1955 AMC 942, the court went beyond the
FELA to allow a Jones Act recovery against the estate of
deceased employer.8 5
The court in Baptiste8 accepted the same reasoning with
respect to awarding punitive damages. It held that decisions under
the FELA are persuasive authority in litigation involving seamen
and the Jones Act, but are not binding." The Baptiste court in-
dicated that there are differences between the two types of
damages. It further stated that the Jones Act is regarded primarily
as an addition to a larger body of federal maritime law, when other
precedents under the FELA would in some manner limit the liability
imposed upon a defendant shipowner." Another example is the
situation when, in setting aside a release under FELA, the claimant
has the burden, while under the maritime law the employer has the
burden."
Vaughan v. Atkinson" is a further illustration in which the
Court held that a seaman is entitled to recover the cost of
reasonable attorneys' fees when the shipowner arbitrarily refuses to
pay him his maintenance."
In addition, another approach that should be taken is the same
type as taken in the Moragne case,92 namely that it is time for a
change. The basis on which it is claimed that the Jones Act does not
provide nonpecuniary damages for death on the high seas is a FELA
case, Michigan Central Railroad Company v. Vreeland." The
Vreeland court denied loss of society as nonpecuniary damages
under the FELA. In Vreeland, the Court commented with respect to
pecuniary damages as follows:
The pecuniary loss is not dependent upon any legal liability of
85. 606 F.2d at 531 (Brown, J., dissenting).
86. Baptiste v. Superior Court, 164 Cal. Rptr. 789 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
87. I& at 797-98.
88. Id. at 798.
89. See, e.g., Cullen v. Pennsylvania R.S. Co., 332 U.S. 625 (1948); Garrett v.
Moore-McCormack Co., Inc., 317 U.S. 249 (1942); Kelcey v. Tankers Co., 217 F.2d 541
(2d Cir. 1954); Harmon v. United States, 59 F.2d 372 (5th Cir. 1932).
90. 369 U.S. 527 (1962).
91. Id. at 530-31.
92. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
93. 227 U.S. 59 (1913).
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the injured person to the beneficiary. That is not the sole test.
There must, however, appear some reasonable expectation of
pecuniary assistance or support of which they have been deprived.
Compensation for such loss manifestly does not include
damages by way of recompense for grief or wounded feelings....
It further stated with respect to pecuniary damages:
A pecuniary loss of damage must be one which can be measured
by some standard. It is a term employed judicially, "not only to
express the character of the loss of the beneficial plaintiff which
is the foundation of the recovery, but also to discriminate be-
tween a material loss which is susceptible of pecuniary valua-
tion, and that inestimable loss of the society and companionship
of the deceased relative upon which, in the nature of things, it is
not possible to set a pecuniary valuation." Patterson, Railway
Accident Law, § 401.11
It is obvious from the aforesaid that it is time for a change. The
Court in Michigan Central Railroad Co. v. Vreeland was saying, in
essence, that loss of society cannot be evaluated with any specificity.
A great deal of change has occurred since then, as evidenced by the
recent holding of the Supreme Court in Norfolk and Western
Railway Company.9" In 1913, statistical information was not main-
tained as it is today. The reasons set forth in Michigan Central
Railroad Company v. Vreeland for denying nonpecuniary damages
are obsolete and no longer valid and should be put to rest like The
Harris burg.
94. 1& at 70.
95. 1& at 71.
96. Norfolk and Western Ry. Co. v. Liepelt, 100 S. Ct. 755 (1980).
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APPENDIX A: LosS OF SUPPORT, WAGES AND DEPENDENCY
Petition of United States Steel Corp., 436 F.2d 1256 (6th Cir.
1970); Civil v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 217 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1954);
Cleveland Tankers v. Tierney, 169 F.2d 622 (6th Cir. 1948); Con-
solidated Mach. Inc. v. Protein Products Corp., 428 F. Supp. 209
(M.D. Fla. 1976); Hamilton v. Canal Barge Co., Inc., 395 F. Supp. 978
(D.C. La. 1975); Nye v. A/S D/S Svendborg, 358 F. Supp. 145
(S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 501 F.2d 376 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 964 (1975); Mascuilli v. United States, 343 F. Supp. 439 (E.D. Pa.
1972); Curry v. United States, 338 F. Supp. 1219 (N.D. Cal. 1971);
Petition of Risdal & Andersen, Inc., 291 F. Supp. 353 (D. Mass. 1968);
Petition of Marina Mercante Nicaraguense, S.A. 248 F. Supp. 15
(S.D.N.Y. 1965), modified on other grounds, 364 F.2d 118 (2d Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1005 (1967); The City of Rome, 48 F.
Supp. 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1930).
APPENDIX B: Loss OF SERVICES
Hlodan v. Ohio Barge Line, Inc., 611 F.2d 71 (5th Cir. 1980);
Curry v. United States, 338 F. Supp. 1219 (N.D. Cal. 1971); Petition
of Marina Mercante, S.A., 248 F. Supp. 15 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), modified
on other grounds, 364 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
1005 (1967).
APPENDIX C: Loss OF NURTURE AND GUIDANCE
Solomon v. Warren, 540 F.2d 777 (5th Cir. 1976); Grigsby v.
Coastal Marine Service of Texas, Inc., 412 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1969),
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cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1033 (1970); Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v.
Richardson, 295 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 989
(1962); National Airlines, Inc. v. Stiles, 268 F.2d 400 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 885 (1959); Mascuilli v. United States, 343 F. Supp.
439 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Petition of Risdal & Andersen, Inc., 291 F. Supp.
353 (D. Mass. 1968).
APPENDIX D: Loss OF FRINGE BENEFITS
Sweeney v. American Steamship Co., 491 F.2d 1085 (6th Cir.
1974); Petition of United States Steel Corp., 436 F.2d 1256 (6th Cir.
1970); Consolidated Mach., Inc. v. Protein Products Corp., 428 F.
Supp. 209 (M.D. Fla. 1976); Mungin v. Calmar S.S. Corp., 342 F.
Supp. 479 (D. Md. 1972); Curry v. United States, 338 F. Supp. 1219
(N.D. Cal. 1971); Cruz v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc.,
310 F. Supp. 1364 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Petition of Marina Mercante, S.A.,
248 F. Supp. 15 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), modified on other grounds, 364 F.2d
118 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1005 (1967).
APPENDIX E: FUNERAL EXPENSES
Law v. Sea Drilling Corp., 523 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1975); Barbe v.
Drummond, 507 F.2d 794 (1st Cir. 1974); Dennis v. Central Gulf S.S.
Corp., 453 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972); Nye v. A/S D/S Svendborg, 358 F.
Supp. 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 501 F.2d 376 (2d Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 964 (1975); Mascuilli v. United States, 343 F. Supp.
439 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
APPENDIX F: LOSS OF PROSPECTIVE INHERITANCE
Solomon v. Warren, 540 F.2d 777 (5th Cir. 1976); Blumenthal v.
United States, 306 F.2d 16 (3d Cir. 1962); National Airlines, Inc. v.
Stiles, 268 F.2d 400 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 885 (1959).
APPENDIX G: LOSS OF SOCIETY
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618 (1978); Sea-land
Services, Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573 (1974); Moragne v. States
Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375 (1970); Michigan Central R.R. v.
Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59 (1913); Smith v. Ithaca Corp., 612 F.2d 215 (5th
Cir. 1980); Hlodan v. Ohio Barge Line, Inc., 611 F.2d 71 (5th Cir.
1980); Ivy v. Security Barge Lines, Inc., 606 F.2d 524 (5th Cir. 1979);
Law v. Sea Drilling Corp., 523 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1975); Landry v.
Two R. Drilling Co., 511 F.2d 138 (5th Cir. 1975); Barbe v. Drum-
mond, 507 F.2d 794 (1st Cir. 1974).
[Vol. 41
MARITIME PERSONAL INJURY
APPENDIX H: Loss OF CONSORTIUM
American Export Lines, Inc. v. Alvez, 100 S. Ct. 1673 (1980);
Christofferson v. Halliburton, Co., 534 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir. 1976); Skid-
more v. Grueninger, 506 F.2d 716, (5th Cir. 1975); Petition of United
States Steel Corp., 436 F.2d 1256 (6th Cir. 1970); Simpson v.
Knutsen, 444 F.2d 523 (9th Cir. 1969); First National Bank in Green-
wich v. National Airlines, Inc., 288 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1961); Middleton
v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 70 F.2d 326 (2d Cir. 1934); New York & Long
Branch Steamboat Co. v. Johnson, 195 F. 740 (3d Cir. 1912); Westcott
v. McAllister Bros., Inc., 463 F. Supp. 1039 (S.D.N.Y. 1978);
Hubschman v. Antilles Airboats, 440 F. Supp. 828 (D. V.I. 1977);
Giglio v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 927 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Rodri-
quez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 525 P.2d 669 (Cal. 1974).
APPENDIX I: PRE-JUDGMENT INTEREST
Robinson v. Pocahontas, Inc., 477 F.2d 1048 (1st Cir. 1973);
Doucet v. Wheless Drilling Co., 467 F.2d 336 (5th Cir. 1972); Dennis
v. Central Gulf S.S. Corp., 453 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972); Williamson v.
Western Pac. Dredging Corp., 441 F.2d 65 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 851 (1971); Stanford Bros. Boats, Inc. v. Vidrine, 412 F.2d
958 (5th Cir. 1969); Noel v. United Aircraft Corp., 342 F.2d 232 (3d
Cir. 1964); Gardner v. National Bulk Carriers, Inc., 333 F.2d 676, (4th
Cir. 1964); Petition of City of New York, 332 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir. 1964);
Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. Richardson, 295 F.2d 583 (2d Cir.
1961); National Airlines Inc. v. Stiles, 268 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1959);
Sabine Towing Co. v. Brennan, 85 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1936); Cortes v.
Baltimore Insular Line, 66 F.2d 526 (2d Cir. 1933); Chicago M., St. P.
& P.R. Co. v. Busby, 41 F.2d 617 (9th Cir. 1930); Parisi v. Lady in
Blue, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 681 (D. Mass. 1977); Nye v. A/S D/S Svend-
borg, 358 F. Supp. 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 501 F.2d 376 (2d Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 964 (1975); Chouest v. A & P Boat
Rentals, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 1290 (E.D. La. 1971); Trexler v. Tug
Raven, 290 F. Supp. 429 (E.D. Va. 1968), reversed, 419 F.2d 536 (4th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 938 (1970); Petition of Marina Mer-
cante Nicaraguense, S.A., 248 F. Supp. 15 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), modified
on other grounds, 364 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
1005 (1967).
APPENDIX J: Loss OF FOOD AND LODGING
Bartholomew v. Universe Tankships, Inc., 279 F.2d 911 (2d Cir.
1960); Curry v. United States, 338 F. Supp. 1219 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
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APPENDIX K: CONSCIOUS PAIN AND SUFFERING
St. Louis & Iron Mtn. Ry. v. Craft, 237 U.S. 648 (1915); Barbe v.
Drummond, 507 F.2d 794 (1st Cir. 1974); Miliski v. Long Island R.R.
Co., 499 F.2d 1169 (2d Cir. 1974); Dennis v. Central Gulf S.S. Corp.,
453 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972); Petition of United States Steel Corp.,
436 F.2d 1256 (6th Cir. 1970); Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v.
Richardson, 295 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1961); Cleveland Tankers v.
Tierney, 169 F.2d 622 (6th Cir. 1948); The Culberson, 61 F.2d 194 (3d
Cir. 1932); Curry v. United States, 338 F. Supp. 1219 (N.D. Cal 1971);
Brown v. Anderson-Nichols & Co., 203 F. Supp. 489 (D. Mass. 1962).
APPENDIX L: PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527 (1962); Baptiste v. Superior
Court, 164 Cal. Rptr. 789 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
APPENDIX M: PRESENT VALUE
Hlodan v. Ohio Barge Line, Inc., 611 F.2d 71 (5th Cir. 1980); Law
v. Sea Drilling Corp., 523 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1975); Petition of United
States Steel Corp., 436 F.2d 1256 (6th Cir. 1970); LeRoy v. Sabena
Belgian World Airlines, 344 F.2d 266 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 878 (1965); Seaboard Air Line R.R. Co. v. Connor,
261 F.2d 656 (4th Cir. 1958); Consolidated Mach. Inc. v. Protein Pro-
ducts Corp., 428 F. Supp. 209 (M.D. Fla. 1976); The City of Rome, 48 F.
Supp. 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1930).
APPENDIX N: INFLATION
Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Liepelt, 100 S. Ct. 755 (1980); Peti-
tion of Canal Barge Co., Inc., 480 F.2d 11 (5th Cir. 1973), modified, 513
F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 840 (1975); Petition of
Marina Nicaraguense, S.A., 364 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 1005 (1967); Curry v. United States, 338 F. Supp. 1219 (N.D.
Cal. 1971); In re Sincere Navigation Corp., 329 F. Supp. 652 (E.D. La.
1971); Brinegar v. San Ore Constr. Co., 302 F. Supp. 630 (E.D. Ark.
1969).
APPENDIX 0: ECONOMIST
Perry v. Allegheny Airlines Inc., 489 F.2d 1349 (2d Cir. 1974);
Barnes v. Smith, 305 F.2d 226 (10th Cir. 1962); In re Sincere Naviga-
tion Corp., 329 F. Supp. 652 (E.D. La. 1971).
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